Description
Naxclow devices use a uniform request-signing scheme based on a hard-coded, platform-wide salt embedded in every firmware image. Once this salt is recovered from any device, an attacker can generate valid signatures for arbitrary device or account operations due to the absence of per-device keys, server-side nonce tracking, or replay protections. Combined with the system’s use of plain HTTP for control-plane traffic, the construction enables broad request forgery and impersonation across the platform.
CVSS breakdown
CVSS 4.0
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Attack Requirements
Present
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Confidentiality (Vulnerable System)
High
Integrity (Vulnerable System)
High
Availability (Vulnerable System)
High
Confidentiality (Subsequent System)
None
Integrity (Subsequent System)
None
Availability (Subsequent System)
None
CVSS 3.1
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High
Affected products
- Naxclow / ix camAll – All
- Naxclow / Smart Doorbell X3All – All
- Naxclow / V720All – All
- Naxclow / X Smart HomeAll – All