Description
During WiFi association, Naxclow device firmware prints the host network’s SSID, PSK, and negotiated WPA keys in cleartext to an exposed UART console on production hardware. The UART pads are labeled, run with default serial settings, and drop to an interactive RT-Thread shell that permits arbitrary memory reads, enabling full firmware extraction. An attacker with brief physical access, common for outdoor-mounted devices, can therefore recover WiFi credentials and bootstrap firmware-side attacks.
CVSS breakdown
CVSS 4.0
Attack Vector
Physical
Attack Complexity
Low
Attack Requirements
None
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Confidentiality (Vulnerable System)
High
Integrity (Vulnerable System)
None
Availability (Vulnerable System)
None
Confidentiality (Subsequent System)
None
Integrity (Subsequent System)
None
Availability (Subsequent System)
None
CVSS 3.1
Attack Vector
Physical
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None
Affected products
- Naxclow / ix camAll – All
- Naxclow / Smart Doorbell X3All – All
- Naxclow / V720All – All
- Naxclow / X Smart HomeAll – All