Description
The nscd service in the GNU C Library 2.3.4 onwards may crash due to a stack overflow when a malicious DNS server returns too large a response for a DNS query, resulting in degraded DNS resolution for the system. Exploitation of this bug needs a system that has nscd enabled and using an untrusted DNS server for name resolution, with the compromised DNS server being capable of processing records large enough to result in a stack overflow in an nscd thread stack. During experimentation, bind 9 was unable to handle large records, but that could change in future or with a different name server. In typical installations, nscd is executed in an isolated context as its own user without a shell, due to which any compromise of that service is isolated. There is a remote possibility of nscd cache corruption if an attacker manages to get the stack pointer into a desired point in the heap, potentially resulting in other caches in nscd being overwritten with corrupt data through the stack overflow, until the buggy code path eventually results in a crash. Finally, a crash in nscd may result in performance degradation when resolving names, but it does not result in a denial of service.
CVSS breakdown
Affected products
- The GNU C Library / glibc2.3.4 – 2.45